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SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION: THE OCTOBER 1996 SUPREME
COURT TERM*
The Honorable Sven Erik Holmest

For the past two years I have had the privilege of introducing this program. The 1996 Term of the United States Supreme Court was by far the most
significant in many years. I congratulate the Law School faculty, and other
panelists on what promises to be a very interesting program today. Before we
get started, I submit for your consideration a few brief introductory comments.

I
First, following the 1995 Term, there was some criticism that the Court
was not meeting its responsibility to address important constitutional issues and
announce generally applicable principles of law. At this same program last year,
I addressed concerns that cases such as Romer v. Evans,' United States v. Virginia,' and BMW North America, Inc. v. Gore3 appeared to be limited to their
specific facts and articulated no generally applicable principles of law.4
By contrast, this term the Court wrestled with vitally important questions,
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner'sGuide to the October 1996 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, October 31, 1997.
t United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
2. 116 S. Ct. 695 (1996).
3. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
4. Only one case this Term arguably falls into the category of ad hoc jurisprudence. In Chandler v.
Miller, 116 S. C. 1295 (1997), the Court tortured Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to overturn a Georgia

statute requiring that candidates for designated state offices pass a drug test in order to qualify for nomination.
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and articulated specific guiding principles for use by government actors, including, among others, federal judges such as myself. Thus, the Court clearly fulfilled its role as the ultimate decision-maker in our society-weighing precedent, tradition, and morality to determine the law of the United States.
Moreover, the subject matter of the opinions issued this term was compelling. For example: Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill6 held that a
state may prohibit doctor-assisted suicide; Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union! held that Congress lacks the power to criminalize the display of indecent material on the Internet; and Agostini v. Felton8 held that public school
teachers may teach federally-financed classes on the premises of parochial
schools.
The Court demonstrated that it is not how many cases the Court chooses to
accept, but rather which cases, of the approximately 8,000 filed, the Court
chooses to decide. Indeed, this term the Court decided 80 cases, only five more
than last year's record low.9
II
Second, this term the Court clearly reflected the political tradition that
brought six justices to the bench. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan stated in
his first inaugural address: '°
We are a nation that has a government-not the other way around. And
this makes us special among the nations of the Earth. Our Government
has no power except that granted it by the people. It is time to check and
reverse the growth of government which shows signs of having grown
beyond the consent of the governed.
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers
granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or to
the people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government
did not create the States; the States created the Federal Government.
Thereafter, Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and five Associate Justices to the Supreme Court. The Court's recent
jurisprudence suggests that a majority of these appointees have undertaken to
make their political philosophy the law of the land. Briefly summarized, this
philosophy maintains that the nation's capital in general-and the United States

5. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
6. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
7. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).

8. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
9. The highest number of cases the Court has decided was 151 in both the 1982 and 1983 Terms. See
generally, Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 53 U.S.L.W. 3028
(1984).
10. Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1991), reprintedin PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF TnE UNrED STATES: RoNALD REAGAN-1981 2 (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office 1982).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss1/6

2

1997]

Holmes: Introduction: The October 1996 Supreme Court Term
INTRODUCTION: THE 1996 SUPREME COURT TERM

Congress in particular-should play a less dominant role in the daily life of the
American people-and that the power exercised by this so-called "federal establishment" should be systematically curtailed. This theme could well be entitled
"Who Do These People Think They Are?"
In this regard, four cases in particular merit your attention:
In City of Boerne v. Flores," the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 2 which prohibited government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion unless the burden "(1) is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."' 3 The Court held that Congress
lacked the power to, in effect, supersede by statute otherwise applicable constitutional principles articulated by the Supreme Court. 4 Indeed, the first principle of constitutional law, as held in Marbury v. Madison," is that it is for the
Court, and no one else, to "say what the law is."' 6 In short, who do the members of Congress think they are?
In Printz v. United States, 7 the Court struck down the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, 8 which commanded the chief law enforcement officer of each local jurisdiction to conduct background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers until a national system has been established. The Court
held, with exhaustive reference to various sections of The Federalist,that the
Act violated state sovereignty principles and thus could not be a law "proper for
carrying into execution" delegated powers within the meaning of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress simply did not have the power to compel action by state government actors. In short, who do the members of Congress think they are?
It is important to note that the dissent by Justice Stevens quoted from The
Federalist with equal zeal and extravagance. 2' In the end, these competing
opinions resemble a made-for-television kidnaping movie 'where the ransom
note is assembled from various words cut out of Life magazine. The effect, of
course, is that each side reached a different conclusion while claiming to reflect
the intent of the Framers as documented by the FederalistPapers.-I respectfully
suggest that a more constructive approach would be to spend less time scuffling
over the legacy of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, and more time

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4.
Id. § 2000bb-1.
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-68.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.

17. 117 S. Ct 2365 (1997).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. 1997).
19. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
20. Such extensive references to the same source in support of drastically different conclusions could
lead one reasonably to ask "Are these justices all reading from the same version of The Federalist?"In fact, it
would appear they are not. In Printz, the majority cited as authority "The Federalist(C. Rossiter ed., 1961)."
Id. at 2372. By contrast, the dissent cited "The Federalist(E. Boume ed., 1947)" Id. at 2388 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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articulating well-reasoned, guiding principles of law based on precedent and
constitutional jurisprudence. A poorly reasoned or impractical result does not
improve because a selected portion of the FederalistPapers,taken out of context, appears to give it some support.2
In Clinton v. Jones," the Court held that a sitting President could be
forced to defend a civil lawsuit based on actions outside of his or her official
duties. The leader of the "federal establishment" is not above the law. In short,
who does the President think he is?
And, finally, in Raines v. Byrd,' the Court rejected a challenge to the
Line Item Veto Acte4 by six members of Congress on the grounds that the alleged diminution of their power as legislators lacked sufficient concrete injury
to give them legal standing to bring suit. This case gives the Court an opportunity to belittle the federal establishment not once-but twice. First, in Raines,
the Court availed itself of the opportunity to throw members of Congress out of
court while lecturing them on the limits of their authority. Listen to the tone of
the opinion:
If one of the members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have
a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead. The
claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with the member's seat, a seat which
the member holds (it may quite arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.'s
In short, who do these people think they are?
A second opportunity to diminish Congress, of course, will arise when the
Court eventually, and in all likelihood, strikes down the Line Item Veto Act.'s
This future opinion, no doubt, will cite The FederalistNo. 78,27 notable in part
for characterizing the judiciary as the "least dangerous" branch of government "because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure." 9 In that paper,
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword

21. In the introduction to his text of The Federalist,Clinton Rossiter states that "by common consent of
learned opinion, the following numbers are the cream of the eighty-five papers: 1, 2, 6, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 23,
37, 39, 47, 48, 49, 51, 62, 63, 70, 78, 84, 85...." TrE FFEDERALIST (C. Rossiter ed., 1961), at p. xvii. In
Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2379, passim, the majority cites The Federalist some 20 times and the dissent some 10
times. It is noteworthy, however, that the majority cited the 21 papers identified by Professor Rossiter as
authoritative only 5 times, and the dissent only once. Thus, what was previously accepted by scholars as

forming the essence of The Federalisthas now been abandoned in a frenzied effort to claim some historical
(as opposed to jurisprudential) antecedent for every statement or proposition of law.
22. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
23. 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
24. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-92 (Supp. 1997).
25. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318.
26. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-92 (Supp. 1997).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed., 1987).
28. Id. at 396.
29. Id.
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or the purse; no direction either of the strength or the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatsoever. It may truly be said to
have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and most ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the advocacy of its
judgments."
Clearly, the power of the purse is essential to the role of the legislative branch,
and thus any statutory transfer of that power to the executive alters the fundamental structure of our government.
It merits attention that these cases reflect not only a political philosophy,
but also a commitment to implement that political philosophy. Historically,
"judicial activism" has been defimed as identifying individual rights in the Constitution which operate as a shield against certain legislative action; "judicial
restraint" has been defined as permitting the legislature to enact laws without
interference from the courts. First in United States v. Lopezi1 in the 1994 Term
32 in 1995, and now in City of
and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
33
34
Boerne and Printz, the Supreme Court determined that the U.S. Congress
did not have the authority to act at all. I ask you to consider whether this is
another form of judicial activism. Rather than identifying individual rights,
which has the effect of prohibiting legislation, this form of judicial activism
identifies constitutional limits on the legislative branch, which has the same
effect.
The Constitution establishes clear and appropriate limits on judicial authority. The guiding principle in our system of justice is that courts are responsible
for interpreting the law and not making the law. Judicial restraint properly requires that judges show great deference to the acts of the legislative branch and
not legislate from the bench. Courts that fail to exercise judicial restraint are in
effect substituting their views for those of elected officials. Therefore, the question becomes whether the efforts of the Supreme Court to implement a political
philosophy properly respect these principles of judicial restraint.
I
My third comment is confined to a single issue. In each of the last two
years, the Supreme Court routinely rejected all government actions based on
race. Consistently, this term in Abrams v. Johnson,35 the Court upheld a judicially created re-districting plan that established only one black majority district,
notwithstanding the documented desire of the Georgia state legislature to create
at least two, if not three, majority black districts. The previous plan developed
by the Georgia legislature had been overturned by the Supreme Court on the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
116 S. CL 1114 (1996).
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157.
Printz, 117 S. CL 2365.
117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
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grounds that race had been a predominant factor in drawing at least one of the
resulting Congressional districts.
The Court continues to reflect an animosity toward all government efforts
to address racial issues. We can anticipate that this trend will continue in the
1997 Term in the Piscataway Township Bd.of Educ. v. Taxman. 6 Therefore,
the question becomes how a democratic society should deal with very serious
problems of race when its elected representatives are not permitted by the Supreme Court to develop and implement solutions that take race into account.
IV
My final comment deals with the criminal law. The Court appears to dislike criminals even- more than it dislikes members of Congress. To that end, in
Ohio v. Robinette,3 the Court unanimously held that once the police had
stopped a car for a traffic infraction, they may go on to request the driver's
permission to search for drugs without informing the driver that he is in fact
free to decline a search and go on his way; in Maryland v. Wilson," the Court
held that the police may routinely order passengers out of a car when the driver
has been pulled over for an ordinary traffic violation-the police need not suspect that the passenger has committed a crime or presents a danger; and, in
Kansas v. Hendricks,39 the Court upheld a Kansas state law that provides for
the civil commitment of persons who, due to a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder" are likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence."
This Sexually Violent Predator Act' allows sexually violent predators to be
confined indefinitely in a mental hospital after having completed their prison
sentences.
An exception to this near-uniform treatment of claims by criminal defendants was Lindh v. Murphy.4' In Lindh, the Court held that the 1994
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)," which
streamlined the habeas corpus appeals process, did not apply retroactively to
petitions already pending on the date of enactment.43 This case is significant
because it clarified an issue that is essential to the proper administration of the
criminal justice system. Such clarity will assist federal judges, such as myself,
to move cases more swiftly and effectively toward a final resolution-which, in
my judgment, is critically important if we are to maintain confidence in our
system of law.
I confess my interest in the Court's opinion in Lindh is personal. I sat by

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).
117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a0 to a17 (1994)
117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997).
28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d) (Supp. 1997).
Lindh, 117 S.Ct. at 2061.
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designation with Judges Ebel and Logan on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
panel that reached the same result as the Supreme Court in a footnote to a case
styled Edens v. Hannigan.' This result was criticized by the Seventh Circuit
when it decided Lindh v. Murphy en banc.4 The Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Lindh rejected the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the intent of Congress regarding retroactivity was clear by negative implication, based on a strict construction of the statute. The Supreme Court, however, upheld both the approach and
conclusion of the Tenth Circuit.
In any event, these are just some of the highlights of the 1996 Term of the
Supreme Court. Again, I congratulate the University of Tulsa Colege of Law
for its continued good work in the area of constitutional law.

44. 87 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 1996). In applicable part, footnote 1 in Edens provides as follows:
The amendments also create a new chapter 154 in Title 28, which provides special habeas corpus
procedures in capital cases. The only effective date provision specified within Title I of the habeas
corpus amendments is under the special death penalty litigation procedures, which states that those
provisions shall apply to cases pending on or after enactment. See Section 107(c). Edens filed his
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the district court on November 16, 1992; he filed his notice
of appeal on October 12, 1994; and a certificate of probable cause was issued pursuant to Rule 22 on
October 17, 1994, all well before the new habeas corpus amendments were enacted. Under these facts
we conclude that the new law does not apply to this case.
45. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996).
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